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Breaking supersingular binary curves
A new quasi-polynomial algorithm
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
Let G be a cyclic group of order n , let 〈g〉 = G and let h ∈ G .
The DLP for (G , g , h) is the problem of ﬁnding the unique k ∈ Z/nZ s.t.
h = gk
We call k the discrete logarithm of h w.r.t. g , and write k = logg h .
Examples:
• Multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq
• Group of rational points on an elliptic curve over Fq
• Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve over Fq
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Supersingular binary curves: genus 1
For i ∈ F2 consider the elliptic curves
Ei/F2 : Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X + i
• Both Ei are supersingular (Ei (F2) has no points of order 2)
• For prime p we have
#Ei (F2p ) =
{
2p + 1 + (−1)i2(p+1)/2 for p ≡ 1, 7 (mod 8)
2p + 1− (−1)i2(p+1)/2 for p ≡ 3, 5 (mod 8)
• (2p + 1± 2(p+1)/2) | (24p − 1) =⇒ Ei has embedding degree 4
Lesson 1 (MOV attack)
Elliptic curves with small embedding degree are weak.
Lesson 2 (Pairing-based cryptography)
Provided that the applications are good enough, ignore Lesson 1.
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Supersingular binary curves: genus 2
For i ∈ F2 let
Hi/F2 : Y 2 + Y = X 5 + X 3 + i
• Both Hi are supersingular (JacHi is isogenous to a product of two
supersingular elliptic curves)
• We have #Jac(Hi )(F2p ) ={
22p + (−1)i2(3p+1)/2 + 2p + (−1)i2(p+1)/2 + 1 for p ≡ 1, 7, 17, 23 (mod 24)
22p − (−1)i2(3p+1)/2 + 2p − (−1)i2(p+1)/2 + 1 for p ≡ 5, 11, 13, 19 (mod 24)
• #Jac(Hi )(F2p ) | (212p − 1) =⇒ Jac(Hi ) has embedding degree 12.
Only genus 1 and 2 seriously considered =⇒ we are interested in the
DLPs in (the prime order r | #Jac subgroups of ) F×24p and F×212p .
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Breaking supersingular binary curves
A new quasi-polynomial algorithm
The Index Calculus Method
Consider the DLP in Fqn . The ICM consists of two stages:
1. Choose a factor base F , ﬁnd relations between elements and then
compute their logarithms.
2. For an arbitrary element, express it as a product of lower degree
elements; recurse until all leaves are in F .
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Smoothness and the F.T.C.
Deﬁnition
An element f ∈ Fq[X ] is said to be B -smooth if all of its irreducible
factors have degree ≤ B .
Theorem (Odlyzko,Lovorn)
The probability that a polynomial f ∈ Fq[X ] of degree m chosen
uniformly at random is B -smooth is
u−(1+o(1))u, where u = m/B
`Fundamental Theorem of Cryptography'
If we have no clue about something, then we can safely assume that it
behaves as a uniformly distributed random variable.
 Igor Shparlinski
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Small to medium characteristic DLP milestones
Deﬁnition
Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and let 0 < c ∈ R . The subexponential function
LQ(α, c) for input Q is deﬁned to be
LQ(α, c) := exp
(
(c + o(1)) (logQ)α (log logQ)1−α
)
bitlength who/when method L(1/3, c) with c =
127 Coppersmith 1984 Proto-FFS [1.526, 1.587]
401 Gordon-McCurley 1992 Coppersmith's [1.526, 1.587]
N/A Adleman 1994 FFS (64/9)1/3 ≈ 1.923
521 Joux-Lercier 2001 FFS (32/9)1/3 ≈ 1.526
607 Thomé 2001 Coppersmith's [1.526, 1.587]
613 Joux-Lercier 2005 FFS (32/9)1/3 ≈ 1.526
556 Joux-Lercier 2006 M-FFS 31/3 ≈ 1.442
676 Hayashi et al. 2010 M-FFS (32/9)1/3 ≈ 1.526
923 Hayashi et al. 2012 M-FFS (32/9)1/3 ≈ 1.526
1175 Joux Dec 2012 M-FFS 21/3 ≈ 1.260
1425 Joux Jan 2013 M-FFS 21/3 ≈ 1.260
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Resisting smoothness heuristics
In Feb 2013, Gölo§lu, G., McGuire and Zumbrägel showed how to
consistently generate smooth polynomials [GGMZ13]. This led to:
• The ﬁrst polynomial time relation generation method for degree one
elements
• The ﬁrst polynomial time elimination method for degree two
elements
• Example DLPs in F21971 and F23164 being solved
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The Joux-Lercier FFS variation [JL06]
To ﬁnd factor base relations in Fqn one uses the following setup.
• Choose g1, g2 ∈ Fq[X ] of degrees d1, d2 s.t. X − g1(g2(X )) has a
degree n irreducible factor I (X ) over Fq , so that
Fqn = Fq[X ]/(I (X )) = Fq(x)
• Let y = g2(x) ; then x = g1(y) and Fqn ∼= Fq(x) ∼= Fq(y)
• In best case factor base is {x − a | a ∈ Fq} ∪ {y − b | b ∈ Fq}
Relation generation:
• Considering elements xy + ay + bx + c with a, b, c ∈ Fq , one
obtains the Fqn -equality
xg2(x) + ag2(x) + bx + c = yg1(y) + ay + bg1(y) + c
• When both sides split over Fq one obtains a relation
Optimising d1 and d2 in [JL06]
F.T.C. =⇒ that as q →∞ each side of xy + ay + bx + c splits over Fq
with probability 1/(d2 + 1)! and 1/(d1 + 1)! respectively.
• =⇒ Choose d1 ≈ d2 ≈
√
n
• For q = Lqn(1/3, 3−2/3) algorithm is Lqn(1/3, 31/3)
A Counterpoint to the F.T.C.
Fortunately, in one sub-case of the [JL06] setup, we do have a clue.
Optimising d1 and d2 in [JL06]
F.T.C. =⇒ that as q →∞ each side of xy + ay + bx + c splits over Fq
with probability 1/(d2 + 1)! and 1/(d1 + 1)! respectively.
• =⇒ Choose d1 ≈ d2 ≈
√
n
• For q = Lqn(1/3, 3−2/3) algorithm is Lqn(1/3, 31/3)
A Counterpoint to the F.T.C.
Fortunately, in one sub-case of the [JL06] setup, we do have a clue.
An auspicious choice for g2
Assume now that the base ﬁeld is Fqk for k ≥ 2.
• Let y = g2(x) = xq
• Eliminates half of the factor base since
(y + b) = (x + b1/q)q =⇒ log(y + b) = q log(x + b1/q)
• The l.h.s. of xy + ay + bx + c becomes
xq+1 + axq + bx + c
• This polynomial provably splits over Fqk with probability
≈ 1/q3  1/(q + 1)!
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Bluher polynomials
Let k ≥ 3 and consider the polynomial X q+1 + aX q + bX + c .
If ab 6= c and aq 6= b , this may be transformed into
FB(X ) = X
q+1
+ BX + B , with B =
(b − aq)q+1
(c − ab)q ,
via X = c−abb−aq X − a .
Theorem (Bluher 2004)
The number of elements B ∈ F×
qk
s.t. the polynomial FB(X ) ∈ Fqk [X ]
splits completely over Fqk equals
qk−1 − 1
q2 − 1 if k is odd ,
qk−1 − q
q2 − 1 if k is even .
Polynomial time relation generation: k ≥ 3
Assume that g1 can be found s.t. X − g1(X q) ≡ 0 (mod I (X )) with
deg(I ) = n ≤ qd1 . Then we have the following method:
• Compute B = {B ∈ F×
qk
| X q+1 + BX + B splits over Fqk}
• Since B = (b − aq)q+1/(c − ab)q , for any a, b ∈ Fqk s.t. b 6= aq ,
and B ∈ B , there exists a unique c ∈ Fqk s.t. xq+1 + axq + bx + c
splits over Fqk
• For each such (a, b, c) , test if r.h.s. yg1(y) + ay + bg1(y) + c
splits; if so then have a relation
• If q3k−3 > qk(d1 + 1)! then for d1 ≥ 1 constant we expect to
compute logs of degree 1 elements of Fqkn in time
O(q2k+1)
Joux's insights
• Independently of [GGMZ13], Joux discovered an isomorphic
poly-time small degree relation generation method.
• For Fq2n , assume h1(X ), h0(X ) ∈ Fq2 [X ] of very small degree exist
s.t. h1(X )X
q − h0(X ) has an irreducible factor I (X ) of degree n .




(F − αG ) ≡ (F qG − FG q) (mod I (X ))
• Since X q ≡ h0(X )/h1(X ) (mod I (X )) , F q & G q have small degree
• Joux insists that r.h.s. is divisible by Q and cofactor is
(D − 1)-smooth =⇒ results in a bilinear quadratic system
Balancing classical descent with this elimination results in a heuristic
Lq2n(1/4 + o(1)) algorithm.
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New method DLP solutions in 2013
• 11th Feb'13, Joux: F21778 in 220 core hours
• 19th Feb'13, GGMZ: F21971 in 3, 132 core hours
• 3rd May'13, GGMZ: F23164 in 107, 000 core hours
• 22nd Mar'13, Joux: F24080 in 14, 100 core hours
• 11th Apr'13, GGMZ: F26120 in 750 core hours
• 21st May'13, Joux: F26168 in 550 core hours
BGJT's quasi-polynomial algorithm on one slide
The key idea behind Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé's algorithm is
to take degree 1 relation generation and replace X by Q(X ) .
For an X q+1 + aX q + bX + c which splits over Fq2 consider
q+1∏
i=1









+ bQ(X ) + c (mod I (X ))
• r.h.s. is dD/2e -smooth with prob. ≈ 1/(D(dh + 1)/(D/2))!
• Collect > q2 such relations and then express logQ as a sum of
O(Dq2) logs of elements of degree at most dD/2e
• Recurse down to degree 1 elements. Heuristic complexity dictated
by #nodes in descent tree: qO(log n)
Lesson 3
For cryptography, the DLP in ﬁnite ﬁelds of small characteristic is dead.
BGJT's quasi-polynomial algorithm on one slide
The key idea behind Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé's algorithm is
to take degree 1 relation generation and replace X by Q(X ) .
For an X q+1 + aX q + bX + c which splits over Fq2 consider
q+1∏
i=1









+ bQ(X ) + c (mod I (X ))
• r.h.s. is dD/2e -smooth with prob. ≈ 1/(D(dh + 1)/(D/2))!
• Collect > q2 such relations and then express logQ as a sum of
O(Dq2) logs of elements of degree at most dD/2e
• Recurse down to degree 1 elements. Heuristic complexity dictated
by #nodes in descent tree: qO(log n)
Lesson 3
For cryptography, the DLP in ﬁnite ﬁelds of small characteristic is dead.
BGJT's quasi-polynomial algorithm on one slide
The key idea behind Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé's algorithm is
to take degree 1 relation generation and replace X by Q(X ) .
For an X q+1 + aX q + bX + c which splits over Fq2 consider
q+1∏
i=1









+ bQ(X ) + c (mod I (X ))
• r.h.s. is dD/2e -smooth with prob. ≈ 1/(D(dh + 1)/(D/2))!
• Collect > q2 such relations and then express logQ as a sum of
O(Dq2) logs of elements of degree at most dD/2e
• Recurse down to degree 1 elements. Heuristic complexity dictated
by #nodes in descent tree: qO(log n)
Lesson 3
For cryptography, the DLP in ﬁnite ﬁelds of small characteristic is dead.
BGJT's quasi-polynomial algorithm on one slide
The key idea behind Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé's algorithm is
to take degree 1 relation generation and replace X by Q(X ) .
For an X q+1 + aX q + bX + c which splits over Fq2 consider
q+1∏
i=1









+ bQ(X ) + c (mod I (X ))
• r.h.s. is dD/2e -smooth with prob. ≈ 1/(D(dh + 1)/(D/2))!
• Collect > q2 such relations and then express logQ as a sum of
O(Dq2) logs of elements of degree at most dD/2e
• Recurse down to degree 1 elements. Heuristic complexity dictated
by #nodes in descent tree: qO(log n)
Lesson 3
For cryptography, the DLP in ﬁnite ﬁelds of small characteristic is dead.
BGJT's quasi-polynomial algorithm on one slide
The key idea behind Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé's algorithm is
to take degree 1 relation generation and replace X by Q(X ) .
For an X q+1 + aX q + bX + c which splits over Fq2 consider
q+1∏
i=1









+ bQ(X ) + c (mod I (X ))
• r.h.s. is dD/2e -smooth with prob. ≈ 1/(D(dh + 1)/(D/2))!
• Collect > q2 such relations and then express logQ as a sum of
O(Dq2) logs of elements of degree at most dD/2e
• Recurse down to degree 1 elements. Heuristic complexity dictated
by #nodes in descent tree: qO(log n)
Lesson 3
For cryptography, the DLP in ﬁnite ﬁelds of small characteristic is dead.
BGJT's quasi-polynomial algorithm on one slide
The key idea behind Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thomé's algorithm is
to take degree 1 relation generation and replace X by Q(X ) .
For an X q+1 + aX q + bX + c which splits over Fq2 consider
q+1∏
i=1









+ bQ(X ) + c (mod I (X ))
• r.h.s. is dD/2e -smooth with prob. ≈ 1/(D(dh + 1)/(D/2))!
• Collect > q2 such relations and then express logQ as a sum of
O(Dq2) logs of elements of degree at most dD/2e
• Recurse down to degree 1 elements. Heuristic complexity dictated
by #nodes in descent tree: qO(log n)
Lesson 3




Breaking supersingular binary curves
A new quasi-polynomial algorithm
Concrete security of small characteristic pairings
Adj, Menezes, Oliveira and Rodríguez-Henríquez used the techniques
from [Joux] and [BGJT] to analyse the concrete security of the DLP in
pairing ﬁelds once thought to be 128-bit secure.
In particular, they showed that:
• The DLP in the 804-bit order r subgroup of F×36·509 can be solved
in time 273.7Mr , using q = 3
6 and k = 2
• The DLP in the 698-bit order r subgroup of F×212·367 can be solved
in time 294.6Mr , using q = 2
12 and k = 2
• The DLP in the 1221-bit order r subgroup of F×24·1223 can be solved
in time ≈ 2128Mr , using q = 212 and k = 2
Consider the following:
• h1(X )X q − h0(X ) ≡ 0 (mod I (X )) =⇒ n ≤ q + deg(h1)
• The descent cost is lower for smaller q
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Our contributions
We exploited the following observations/principles/techniques:
• h1(X q)X − h0(X q) ≡ 0 (mod I (X )) =⇒ n ≤ q · deg(h1) + 1
• Principle of parsimony: always try to work in the target ﬁeld; only
when this fails should one embed into an extension
• A bonus of solving factor base logs in an extension is that one can
factor elements over the extension during the descent
• Another bonus is that k = 1 can be used for the GB phase,
eliminating higher degrees & postponing the need for the QPA
As a result, we showed that the:
• DLP in order r subgroup of F×24·1223 costs at most 259 Mr
• DLP in order r subgroup of F×212·367 costs at most 248 Mr
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Solving the DLP in F212·367
Over F2367 the Jacobian of H0/F2 : Y 2 + Y = X 5 + X 3 has a subgroup
of prime order r = (2734 + 2551 + 2367 + 2184 + 1)/(13 · 7170258097) .
• Let F212 = F2[U]/(U12 + U3 + 1) = F2(u)
• Let F2367 = F2[X ]/(I (X )) = F2(x) where I (X ) the irreducible
degree 367 divisor of h1(X
64)X − h0(X 64) , with
h1 = X
5 + X 3 + X + 1, h0 = X
6 + X 4 + X 2 + X + 1
• F212·367 is then the compositum of F212 and F2367




(bpi · 2i+1c mod 2) · u11−(i mod 12) · xbi/12c
Factor base logs and initial descent
We also represent F212 as Fq2 with q = 26 and k = 2:
• Let F26 = F2[U]/(T 6 + T + 1) = F2(t)
• Let F212 = F26 [V ]/(V 2 + tV + 1) = F26(v)
Since q2k−3 ≯ (6 + 1)! we consider relations over Fq4 instead:
• Let F224 = F26 [W ]/(W 4 + W 3 + W 2 + t3) = F26(w)
Gal(F224/F2) acts on the degree 1 factor base {x + a | a ∈ F224} :
(x + a)2
367
= x + a2
367
= x + a2
7
=⇒ factor base has 699, 252 elements and linear system was solved in
4896 core hours on a 24 core cluster.
Initial descent: We performed a continued fraction initial split, then
degree-balanced classical descent to degrees ≤ 8 in 38224 core hours.
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The GB phase cost 8432 core hours on Magma V2.20-1, for a total of
approximately 52240 core hours. On 30/1/14 we announced that
xpi = g




New DLP record: On 31/1/14 we also announced the solution of a DLP
in F29234 = Fq2(q+1) with q = 29 , which took just under 400,000 core
hours (courtesy of ICHEC's new Fionn cluster).
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Degree 2 elimination over F224
Let Q(y) = y2 + q1y + q0 ∈ F224·367 be an element to be eliminated, i.e.,
written as a product of linear elements.
• Recall that in F224·367 we have y = x64 and x = h0(y)/h1(y) , so for
any univariate polynomials w0,w1 we have
w0(x




(w0(y) h0(y) + w1(y) h1(y))
• Compute a reduced basis of the lattice
LQ = {(w0(Y ),w1(Y )) ∈ F224 [Y ]2 : w0(Y ) h0(Y )+w1(Y ) h1(Y ) ≡ 0 (mod Q(Y ))}
• In general we have (u0,Y + u1), (Y + v0, v1) , with ui , vi ∈ F224 ,
and for s ∈ F224 we have (Y + v0 + su0, sY + v1 + su1) ∈ LQ
• r.h.s. 1h1(y) ((y + v0 + su0) h0(y) + (sy + v1 + su1) h1(y)) has degree
dh + 1 = 7, so cofactor splits with probability ≈ 1/5!
• l.h.s. is (x64 + v0 + su0)x + (sx64 + v1 + su1) which is of the form
xq+1 + axq + bx + c
Degree 2 elimination over F224
Consider the l.h.s. xq+1 + sxq + (u00 + sv00)x + (u10 + sv10) .
• Compute the set B of 64 elements B ∈ F224 such that
X 65 + BX + B splits over F224
• For each B ∈ B we try to solve B = (b − a64)65/(c − ab)64 for s ,
i.e., ﬁnd s ∈ F224 that satisﬁes
B =
(s64 + u0s + v0)
65
(u0s2 + (u1 + v0)s + v1)64
• Solvable either by taking the GCD with s224 − s , or by expressing s
in an F224/F26 basis and solving the resulting quadratic system




Breaking supersingular binary curves
A new quasi-polynomial algorithm













































































































































































































• If dh ≤ 2, then r.h.s. cofactor of a degree 2 element being
eliminated is linear =⇒ no smoothness heuristics needed for descent
• Using reducible degree 2's =⇒ degree 1 relation generation does
not use smoothness heuristics
Hence no smoothness heuristics are needed!
Heuristic 1
Given a prime p and an integer n there exist a power q of p , an integer
k ≥ 1 and polynomials h0, h1 ∈ Fqk [X ] of degree at most two s.t.
h1(X
q)X − h0(X q) has an irreducible factor of degree n .
Heuristic 2
There exists a polynomial time algorithm for obtaining the logarithms of
polynomials of bounded degree using the parameters from Heuristic 1.
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A new quasi-polynomial algorithm
Theorem
Subject to Heuristics 1 and 2, the running time of the new QPA is
quasi-polynomial, namely
qlog2 q+O(1).
Thanks for your attention!
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